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Abstract
the administration of elections in South Africa, including the 2011 local 
government elections (hereafter the 2011 elections), has widely been hailed as 
a resounding success. Yet competitive elections, an essential component of any 
democratic system, require more than smooth running administrative systems. 
competitive elections require competitive campaigns and an environment 
where voters can vote and express their opinions without fear of retribution. 
in this article, we conduct a systematic assessment of pre-election space in 
the 2011 elections. We present a unique coding scheme developed by the 
election monitoring network (emn) to grade individual instances of election-
related intolerance and intimidation. the coding scheme provides a framework 
to quantitatively assess a given campaign and election. We also present data 
on instances of pre-election intimidation and violence gathered by the emn 
from 3 march until 13 may. the data reveal that whilst the vast majority of 
South Africans can vote and express their opinions without fear of retribution, 
there are underlying tensions which remain a cause for concern. When viewed 
in conjunction with the Afrobarometer survey data (2008) on perceptions of 
political space in South Africa, it becomes clear that pre-election campaign 
space is fragile and not given, and will therefore need to be nurtured in future 
elections.
Keywords: campaign environment, democracy, election administration, 
election monitoring, local government elections, South Africa
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1 BACKGROUND
It is widely accepted that competitive elections are an essential component of 
democracy. Competitive elections in turn require competitive election campaigns 
and an environment where voters can vote and express their opinions without fear 
of retribution. Such an environment provides the basis for a campaign period which 
strengthens democracy by allowing competing parties to articulate their stances 
(Street 2001: 253); by giving citizens unfettered access to alternative sources of 
information, including independent media and divergent opinion (Diamond 1996: 
11); and by providing incentives for people to vote. Thus, the pre-election period 
is of critical importance because, as Kavanagh (1995: 1) argues, campaigns ‘allow 
voters to hear politicians defend their records, criticize those of their opponents 
and propose policies’. Ideally the campaign period should provide information 
which allows voters to evaluate their political leaders, as well as to test the worth 
of public policy. Mattes and Bratton (2003: 30) indicate that ‘information about 
incumbent political leaders creates a point of vicarious contact between citizens and 
the political system, as well as a means by which they can better follow the process 
of decision-making’.  For campaigns to play this role, it is necessary to have free 
flow of information, open discussion and vigorous debate. It is also necessary to 
have an environment where voters can, without fear of reprisal or retribution due to 
their beliefs or affiliations, feel free to express their opinions, including those about 
the strengths and weaknesses of political leaders and policies, and can feel free to 
gather whatever information they deem relevant for their voting decision.
The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) requires political parties to 
publicly commit themselves to the Electoral Code of Conduct thereby creating an 
environment in which all parties can campaign freely and voters can express their 
opinions without fear of retribution.  Indeed, all of South Africa’s democratic elections 
to date have been declared as ‘free and fair’ by observer groups. Campaigning in 
South Africa’s democratic elections has not been docile, with fierce competition 
displayed by all parties. This fierce competition in itself is not necessarily a problem 
and some would argue that it constitutes an integral and valuable part of South 
Africa’s democratic system. However, the campaign period of democratic elections 
has also been characterised by hostile exchanges between political leaders and party 
members. There have been concerns about acts of intolerance, obstruction and 
intimidation including disrupted meetings and allegations of voter intimidation. This 
article presents a systematic assessment of the extent and severity of such instances 
in the run-up to the 2011 local government elections (hereafter the 2011 elections).
The Election Monitoring Network (EMN) which gathered the data presented in 
this article was established in 2008 and operated during the 2009 national election 
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(hereafter the 2009 election) as part of a civil society observer network. The EMN 
is a network of independent civil society organisations including the South African 
Council of Churches-WC (SACC-WC), the Southern African Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference (SACBC) and the Black Sash. In 2009, the EMN used a national team 
of field monitors, who completed a series of training courses. 
In the 2011 elections, the EMN was again accredited by the IEC to complement 
its formal work. The overall aim of the network was to reduce levels of conflict and 
violence and assist in providing credibility for the electoral process. The EMN tracked 
incidents of violence as well as other incidents which breached the Electoral Code 
of Conduct or which compromised the holding of free and fair elections. Funding 
constraints in 2011 meant that it was impossible to repeat the large field operation of 
2009. However, the overall election monitoring infrastructure remained in place, and 
in the six provinces where election violence was most likely, a full time co-ordinator 
was in place with smaller numbers of field monitors. In order to fill in the capacity 
gap resulting from the smaller number of personnel, as well as to take advantage 
of technological developments to encourage greater public involvement in election 
monitoring, the EMN established an SMS hotline number (33830). Members of the 
public were able to report incidents which they witnessed. These incidents would 
then be reported to the EMN head office as well as to the Provincial Co-ordinators. 
The EMN developed a set of referral procedures for incidents at different levels of 
severity, and these did not preclude immediate referral to the police or other local 
agencies if the Provincial Co-ordinator felt it was warranted. Serious crises were 
to be referred to the Eminent Persons’ Group, whose members came from different 
backgrounds and different parts of the country. This Group took action once during 
the campaign, after the death of Andries Tatane in Ficksburg in the Free State. One 
full-time staff member at the EMN head office took particular responsibility for 
liaison with security agencies, relaying information gathered by the EMN to the 
police and other agencies, and feeding back information provided by these agencies 
to the EMN for analysis. As well as gathering data and referring incidents to official 
agencies, EMN Provincial Co-ordinators also carried out behind-the-scenes conflict 
resolution work in areas which, while still peaceful, had shown clear signs of the 
potential to become volatile. In this assignment, the EMN was assisted by many 
Provincial Co-ordinators with a long track-record of community involvement and 
conflict resolution in their own regions.
On voting day, the EMN had additional assistance from volunteers in different 
parts of the country. A small call centre was established in the EMN’s head office, 
with four additional staff being recruited for the day to assist the two full-time EMN 
staff members in operating it. Provincial Co-ordinators were contacted three times 
during the day with specific questions concerning both specific incidents and the 
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general atmosphere in their province. Provincial Co-ordinators were also free to call 
in at any other time if serious situations emerged, although this only happened once 
during voting day.
The data collection methods included: (1) data gathered directly by Provincial 
Co-ordinators and their field personnel; (2) media monitoring carried out by the 
EMN head office, Provincial Co-ordinators and the Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa (IDASA); (3) incidents reported via the SMS hotline and call centre; and (4) 
monitoring of social networking sites.
Two reports that analysed trends during the election campaign were produced 
by the EMN Analysis Hub as well as three on the day of the election itself. These 
reports were based on data gathered from Provincial Co-ordinators and their field 
personnel, the SMS hotline and media monitoring. Social networking sites were also 
monitored during the campaign although this only uncovered one minor incident. 
The three reports produced on polling day were produced on the basis of the 
information gathered in the call centre, as well as media monitoring and monitoring 
of social networking sites.
It is worth noting that most of the serious violence relating to the 2011 elections, 
as reported by the media, occurred during the first two months of 2011, and thus was 
not captured by the monitoring process. This violence was a consequence of tensions 
within the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
relating to candidate selection, with the tension within the IFP eventually becoming 
so serious that the party fractured. The EMN’s internal reporting and analysis ran 
from 3 March until 13 May, which was five days prior to voting day. In the final few 
days, both Provincial Co-ordinators and the EMN head office focused on building 
their operational systems for voting day itself. By that stage, the broadly peaceful 
nature of the 2011 election campaign had been established.
2 THE EMN CODING SCHEME AND INTENSITY SCALE
The coding scheme used by the EMN aimed to ensure that any violation reported 
to it could be included in a database by using a simple numerical code. The core of 
the scheme is its ‘intensity scale’. This was introduced because simply reporting the 
total number of incidents gives an incomplete picture. Without being able to rank 
incidents by intensity, there is no way to distinguish between the incidents in terms 
of their severity – for example, posters being removed will not be distinguishable 
from a political murder. In the past, this distinction had, of course, been made 
by qualitative narrative analysis, and this remains a useful technique in election 
monitoring. However, quantitative analysis can be useful, firstly, in minimising the 
risk of observer bias in interpreting data. Secondly, when the number of serious 
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incidents is large, narrative analysis that is not supported by robust analysis of 
quantitative data can be selective and potentially misleading.
The scheme aimed to be comprehensive enough to code any incident likely to 
emerge in the current South African political environment. Events on the upper-end 
of the intensity scale have been rare in recent South African elections. However, 
in South Africa’s early democratic elections they were not unknown. The value of 
the intensity scale is that it provides the basis for a comparative assessment given 
that pre-election violence remains a continuing problem in many countries. The 
coding scheme can be used in any context and should new problems arise which 
are not included in the scheme, it is flexible enough to easily create new codes. The 
intensity scale has been drafted to be easily useable not only in future elections in 
South Africa, but in other countries also. The scale can not only be used for public 
elections, but also for internal party selection and elective processes.
The intensity scale runs from 1 to 9, with the highest number being the most serious 
incident. At its upper end, it lists events which would grievously threaten democracy 
and the rule of law.  Murder on a grand scale and vote-buying on a national scale are 
examples of upper-end incidents. At its lower end, are those incidents that happen in 
almost every democracy, such as the removal of posters. While these can have other 
damaging consequences, they do not of themselves seriously endanger a free and 
fair election. However, particular concentrations of these low-level incidents can 
be indicative of a region where there is an elevated risk of more serious problems 
emerging. The scale gives examples of the sort of behaviour indicated by each level 
of intensity, and then links each to suggested action by the collating and responding 
functions of the EMN.
The full EMN Incident Coding Scheme and Intensity Scale are laid out in the 
addendum at the end of the chapter.
3 FINDINGS
The primary finding emanating from the data collected by the EMN was that the 
pre-election campaign environment in 2011 was a peaceful one in which voters did 
not have to fear acts of intolerance, obstruction and intimidation. This reflects the 
fact that democratic elections in South Africa have been, and continue to be, largely 
peaceful, albeit with isolated cases of grave violence or misconduct. Overall, the 
EMN’s data recorded a pre-election period in 2011 that stands out in the democratic 
era as being particularly peaceful with minimal experience of political intolerance. 
However, the same cannot be said of parties’ internal candidate selection processes, 
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which were marked by considerable tension and occasional serious violence, much 
of this occurring in the first two months of 2011 before the EMN became operational.
As in previous elections, the total number of reports received was not high. 
From 3 March until 13 May 2011, the EMN received only 80 incident reports that 
were serious and detailed enough to be used for quantitative analysis. This was 
undoubtedly a snapshot of what actually happened on the ground, particularly in 
relation to trivial incidents such as poster removal or non-violent, but abusive, 
confrontations between political rivals. It is highly likely, however, that the more 
serious incidents were captured almost universally. These were often reported by 
more than one mechanism, for example by different media channels, or by both the 
Provincial Co-ordinators and the press.
Although election violence was sporadic, there were definite trends to be noted, 
and these are examined using the data presented in the tables below. The tables 
reflect the EMN’s analysis of hotspots; changing nature of incidents over time; 
evolving patterns of major causes of incidents; and inter-party disputes. The term 
‘total intensity’ (used in the tables) refers to the simple addition of the total score on 
the intensity scale for each incident recorded. 
Table 1 ranks the five municipalities in which the highest ‘total intensity’ of 
incidents was reported, either due to a large number of incidents or a smaller number 
of very serious incidents. Buffalo City (East London) was a location of enduring 
tension throughout the campaign, so it is no surprise to see it topping the list of 
municipalities for the total intensity of incidents reported during the campaign. 
eThekwini (Durban) also reported some serious incidents early in the campaign; 
however, the atmosphere improved dramatically towards the end of the campaign. 
There were a large number of very minor incidents reported in Cape Town  and, to 
a lesser extent, in Johannesburg. Many of these were reported by the SMS hotline 
and this almost certainly reflects better penetration of the hotline number in the two 
largest cities.
Table 1: Top six municipalities by total intensity of incidents reported
Municipality No. of incidents Total intensity
Buffalo City 8 26
eThekwini 6 21
Johannesburg 7 18
Cape Town 14 17
Tshwane 3 10
Source: EMN 2011
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Table 2 shows the total intensity of incidents week by week during the campaign. 
There were two spikes in the number of incidents reported – one in the first half of 
April, and the second in the first half of May. The April spike probably reflected 
two factors. The first was simply an operational matter of monitoring networks 
becoming more effective and alert as they settled down. Another better explanatory 
factor, however, is that inter-party competition was increasing in this period as the 
election campaign proper commenced, while at the same time, bad feelings about 
internal selection disputes were continuing. This pattern will be seen more clearly 
in Table 3.
It is notable that the spike in early May was as a result of many minor incidents 
being reported. Many of these incidents were related to posters being removed, foul-
mouthed confrontations between supporters of different parties and incidents around 
the distribution of food parcels. Only one of these incidents was violent and even 
that was not remotely life-threatening. This reflected a campaigning atmosphere 
which was aggressive and boisterous, but not violent.
Table 2: Total intensity of incidents by week
Week ending No. of incidents Total intensity
11 March 4 14
18 March 2 6
25 March 2 6
1 April 5 23
8 April 12 27
15 April 12 45
22 April 8 21
29 April 7 15
6 May 18 27
13 May 10 14
Source: EMN 2011
In Table 3 below, the data were broken down to look at the changing nature of 
incidents over time. The incidents were categorised into fortnightly rather than 
weekly periods, given the small total number of data items. In the March period, the 
majority of incidents related to disputes around internal candidate nomination issues 
within the ANC. Indeed, there were some serious violent incidents related to internal 
selection issues during this period – one serious incident of arson in Limpopo, the 
death of a man in Eastern Cape and two separate conspiracies to murder in Eastern 
Cape and Gauteng.
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In early April, the overall severity of incidents peaked as selection disputes 
continued while the election campaign proper matured and incidents between 
parties became more prominent. Internal selection issues became less common as 
voting day approached, although they never stopped entirely. Incidents relating to 
disputes between parties became more prevalent although, as noted above, many of 
them were trivial.
Detailled reports received by the EMN from field workers indicated an overlap 
between the issue of service delivery and the issue of candidate selection. A high 
proportion of the incidents related to internal selection problems were explicitly 
linked by participants to service delivery issues. Service delivery protests became a 
major item on the political agenda and in the news headlines during the campaign. 
This was most graphically captured in the death of Andries Tatane in Ficksburg 
(Free State), as well as the ‘toilet saga’ in the Western Cape, North West, and Free 
State.
The two incidents categorised as ‘other/unknown’ are worth noting. Both related 
to ANC councillors in KwaZulu-Natal being gunned down by unknown and clearly 
skilled assassins a month apart, one in Durban and the other one in Pietermaritzburg. 
Further information about these incidents has been difficult to come by.
Table 3: Total intensity of cause of incident
Period Disputes 
between 
parties
Internal 
selection 
problems
Service 
delivery 
issues
Campaigning 
beyond 
acceptable 
boundaries
Other or 
unknown
3 March –  
18 March 0 10 0 0 6
19 March –  
1 April 11 10 4 4 6
2 April –  
15 April 23 26 20 7 0
16 April –  
29 April 13 16 3 4 0
30 April –  
13 May 26 7 6 2 0
Source: EMN 2011
Table 4 below examines which parties were involved in inter-party disputes. The 
EMN recorded 11 serious incidents – defined as having a score of 3 or more on the 
intensity scale – involving activists from different parties. Serious violence between 
parties was rare in the 2011 election campaign. Of the few incidents that did happen, 
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the pattern of IFP-NFP tension was clear and perhaps not surprising, given the bitter 
split that resulted in the birth of the National Freedom Party just a few months 
before the election. Despite this, narrative reports from the EMN field workers in 
KwaZulu-Natal consistently reported a generally peaceful atmosphere, and a much 
higher level of tolerance of ANC campaigning in IFP strongholds in 2011 than at 
any other time in the democratic era.
Table 4: Number of inter-party dispute incidents by total intensity of parties  
involved
Parties involved Number of incidents Number of incidents involving 
violence to persons
IFP and NFP 3 2
ANC and DA 3 0
ANC and IFP 2 0
ANC and COPE 1 0
Unknown (victim 
IFP) 1 1
Unspecified 1 0
Source: EMN 2011
On voting day itself there were also very few serious election-related problems. In 
Buffalo City, a councillor’s house was burned down. In the Free State, a temporary 
tent voting station was burned down, but the IEC quickly moved to provide a 
new tent. Premises due to be used as a voting station in Limpopo were burned 
down the night before the election, although local sources indicated this was not 
caused by election-related tensions and was not a deliberate attempt to disrupt the 
election. In the Western Cape, a polling station in Delft was broken into the night 
before the elections. Most problems were more of the administrative in nature. In 
Soweto and surrounding areas, such as Eldorado Park and Kliptown, a shortage of 
ballot papers was experienced at a number of polling stations very early in the day, 
causing frustration among voters. More widely, there were a series of minor issues 
in different parts of South Africa. These included the late opening of voting stations, 
the late arrival of ballot papers, and parties campaigning in the immediate precincts 
of voting stations. According to EMN information, the IEC responded quickly 
to these problems, which occurred at a small minority of voting stations. There 
were problems with identity scanning machines in some voting stations, leading to 
long queues and voter frustration. A switch to manual checking of the voters’ roll 
resolved the problem in many places. Both the IEC and the South African Police 
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Service (SAPS) acted swiftly to resolve issues as they occurred. Overall the election 
ran smoothly and took place in a peaceful, and even jovial atmosphere.
The EMN data revealed that South Africa’s electoral democracy has matured 
significantly since 1994. In addition to an objectively free pre-election environment, 
it is also important that the environment be perceived as free. We now turn to 
perceptions about South Africa’s political environment. To gauge the perceptions 
of ordinary South Africans about this matter, we turn to the data recorded by 
Afrobarometer’s pre-election survey (2008) which was conducted six months prior 
to the 2009 election. Whilst somewhat dated, this survey provides the most relevant 
indicators on these issues. The overall finding was that South Africans’ perceptions 
of their political environment were not entirely positive, especially in comparison to 
perceptions among citizens of Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho and Namibia.
In keeping with Afrobarometer’s protocol, face-to-face interviews were conducted 
in 11 official languages with a nationally representative probability sample of 2 400 
respondents across all nine provinces during October and November 2008. These 
procedures were also followed in the surveys done in Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho 
and Namibia.
It should be kept in mind that the survey was conducted around the time that the 
Congress of the People (COPE) was formed in December 2008. The campaign for 
the 2009 election was particularly competitive. After the formation of COPE by 
Mosiuoa Lekota and Mbhazima Shilowa, the country witnessed acrimonious and 
often hostile exchanges between it and the ANC, as well as reports of disrupted 
meetings and allegations of voter intimidation in the by-elections held in mid-
December 2008. The 2009 election was finally recorded as a peaceful and well-
administered election by the IEC and observer groups, including the EMN. The 
South African survey (conducted during October and November 2008 by Citizen 
Surveys) revealed that a significant proportion of citizens feared the re-emergence 
of political violence and intimidation in South Africa’s electoral politics. The overall 
finding was that South Africans’ perceptions of their political environment were not 
entirely positive.
When asked, ‘In this country, how free are you to say what you think?’ less than 
half (48 per cent) of South Africans said that they felt ‘completely free’ to say what 
they think. More than a quarter (28 per cent) were more circumspect and indicated 
that they were ‘somewhat free’. Of concern is the fact that one in 10 South Africans 
(9 per cent) said that they were ‘not free at all’, while 13 per cent said that they were 
‘not very free’. Taken together then, about a fifth of South Africans reported not 
feeling confident to say what they think. The proportion of South Africans who felt 
‘completely free’ to express themselves was also found to be much lower than that 
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of citizens in Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho and Namibia. It is interesting to note that 
71 per cent of those surveyed in Lesotho felt completely free to express themselves.
Table 5: Perceptions of freedom of speech
Question: In this country, how free are you to say what you think? 
Botswana Malawi Lesotho Namibia South Africa
Not at all free 1% 3.9% 8.6% 4.9% 9%
Not very free 4% 6.6% 8.1% 10.4% 13%
Somewhat free 10% 10.2% 9.2% 26.4% 28%
Completely free 84% 77.5% 70.8% 57.7% 48%
Don’t know 1% 1.8% 3.3% 0.6% 1%
Source: Afrobarometer 2008
A second indicator relating to freedom of political speech asked, ‘In this country, 
how often do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?’ The results 
revealed higher levels of caution. Only a quarter (25 per cent) in South Africa felt 
that they ‘never’ have to be careful while 27 per cent said that they ‘rarely’ have to 
do so. It is disquieting to note that one in five South Africans (22 per cent) said that 
they ‘always’ have to be careful of what they say about politics, while 21 per cent 
said that they ‘often’ have to be careful. Overall, 23 per cent of South Africans felt 
guarded about expressing their political opinions. On this indicator, South Africans 
were more positive than their counterparts in Lesotho, but were considerably more 
negative than those surveyed in Botswana, Malawi and Namibia.
Table 6: Perceptions of freedom of political speech
Question: In this country, how often do people have to be careful of what they say about 
politics?
Botswana Malawi Lesotho Namibia South Africa
Never 51% 41.5% 11.3% 22.2% 25%
Rarely 16% 19.4% 17.1% 28.8% 27%
Often 10% 15.1% 21.1% 28.2% 21%
Always 18% 20.2% 45.2% 18.7% 22%
Don’t know 5% 3.5% 5.3% 2.2% 5%
Source: Afrobarometer 2008
The indicator on freedom of association revealed a more positive result in South 
Africa. The majority of South Africans said that they felt free to join any political 
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party. Overall, 60 per cent said that they felt ‘completely free’ to do so, while 20 
per cent said that they felt ‘somewhat free’. However, it is still a concern that about 
one in five South Africans (18 percent) said that they felt ‘not very free’ or ‘not at 
all free’ to join their preferred organisation. Furthermore, this was still considerably 
more constrained than those surveyed in Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho and Namibia, 
where 93 per cent, 85 per cent, 78 per cent and 66 per cent respectively indicated 
that they felt ‘completely free’ to join any organisation.  
Table 7: Perceptions of freedom of political association
Question: In this country, how free are you to join any political organisation you want to? 
Botswana Malawi Lesotho Namibia South Africa
Not at all free 1% 2.4% 5% 3% 7%
Not very free 1% 4.1% 5% 8% 11%
Somewhat free 5% 6.8% 8% 22.2% 20%
Completely free 93% 85.2% 78% 65.8% 60%
Don’t know 1% 1.3% 5% 1% 2%
Source: Afrobarometer 2008
A similar pattern emerged with regard to freedom on voting day. The majority of 
South Africans said that they felt free to vote for the political party they preferred 
without feeling pressurised. Overall, 61 per cent said that they felt ‘completely free’ 
to do so, while 21 per cent said that they felt ‘somewhat free’. Overall, 16 per 
cent of South Africans said that they felt ‘not very free’ or ‘not at all free’ to vote 
as they wished. Again, when compared to those surveyed in Botswana, Malawi, 
Lesotho and Namibia (where 94 per cent, 90 per cent, 83 per cent and 70 per cent 
respectively indicated that they felt ‘completely free’ to vote as they pleased), the 
finding was not that positive. 
Table 8: Perceptions of voting freedom 
Question: In this country, how free are you to choose who to vote for without feeling pres-
sured?
Botswana Malawi Lesotho Namibia South Africa
Not at all free 0.4% 1.4% 3.4% 1.5% 8%
Not very free 1% 1.8% 2.9% 5.4% 8%
Somewhat free 4% 5.7% 6.6% 21.5% 21%
Completely free 94% 89.8% 83.3% 70.4% 61%
Don’t know 1% 1.1% 3.8% 1.2% 2%
Source: Afrobarometer 2008
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By 2008, a sizable proportion of South Africans feared that the secrecy of their ballot 
could be compromised. Furthermore, South Africans expressed less confidence 
in ballot secrecy than they did 10 years ago. In order to find a wording for the 
question that was relevant across all 20 countries where the Afrobarometer survey 
was conducted, it was decided on: ‘How likely do you think it is that powerful 
people can find out how you voted, even though there is supposed to be a secret 
ballot in this country?’ The South African results revealed that just six in 10 (58 per 
cent) potential voters expressed confidence in the secrecy of the ballot. However, 
one third of all respondents felt that it was ‘somewhat likely’ (20 per cent) or ‘very 
likely’ (13 per cent) that a ‘powerful person could find out’ how they voted. An 
additional 9 per cent were not sure whether this was possible or not. This result 
revealed significantly less confidence in ballot secrecy than the outcome of a slightly 
differently worded question asked in an Idasa/Markinor/SABC Opinion 99 survey 
before the 1999 election. About two-thirds of all the respondents concluded that it 
was either ‘not very possible’ (16 per cent) or ‘not possible at all’ (50 per cent) for 
someone to find out how they marked their ballot (Mattes, Harris and Greyling: 
1999). Table 9 shows that South Africans were again more negative than their 
counterparts in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Namibia. 
Table 9: Confidence in ballot secrecy
Question: How likely do you think is it that powerful people can find out how you voted, even 
though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in this country?
Botswana Malawi Lesotho Namibia South Africa
Not at all likely 72% 76.0% 46.0% 38.2% 32%
Not very likely 12% 9.1% 15.7% 22.2% 26%
Somewhat likely 8% 6.1% 15.3% 19.2% 20%
Very likely 4% 5.0% 17.7% 9.8% 13%
Don’t know 5% 3.7% 5.3% 10.5% 9%
Source: Afrobarometer 2008
A particularly important question related to fear of political violence. Respondents 
were asked the question: ‘During election campaigns in this country, how much do 
you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?’ Only 
just over a third of potential voters (38 per cent) in South Africa said that they feared 
it ‘not at all”.  More than a quarter (29 per cent) were apprehensive, saying that they 
feared it ‘a little bit’. But approximately 30 per cent of voters said they feared it 
‘somewhat’ (18 per cent) or ‘a lot’ (10 per cent).  Given the fact that in 2009, the IEC 
and EMN recorded a peaceful and well-administered election, it is interesting to 
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note that South Africans were more fearful than the citizens of Botswana, Malawi, 
Namibia and Lesotho. 
Table 10: Fear of political violence
Question: During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear be-
coming a victim of political intimidation or violence?
Botswana Malawi Lesotho Namibia South Africa
A lot 3% 20.6% 17.7% 10.6% 10%
Somewhat 4% 12.6% 13.5% 23.3% 18%
A little bit 9% 12.6% 15.1% 31.6% 29%
Not at all 83% 52.6% 50.7% 32.2% 38%
Don’t know 1% 1.7% 3.1% 2.3% 5%
Source: Afrobarometer 2008
Even more telling is the fact that half of South Africans felt that competition between 
political parties ‘always’ or ‘often’ leads to violent conflict. On this indicator, only 
Botswana received a positive rating, which is hardly surprising, given the country’s 
long history of political stability. Indeed the perception that competition between 
political parties leads to conflict is not entirely unwarranted. As noted above 
interaction between the ANC and COPE was particularly hostile in the run-up to the 
2009 elections and in 2011 the split in the IFP led to several pre-election incidents 
of violence. In many instances campaign rhetoric was highly inflammatory with 
political leaders launching scathing attacks on each other. These verbal attacks were 
often racialised, fuelling inter-racial animosity. More systematic research is required 
on this issue.  
Table 11: Perceptions of political competition between parties 
Question: In your opinion, how often in this country does competition between political  
parties lead to violent conflict?
Botswana Malawi Lesotho Namibia South Africa
Never 70% 20.9% 5.8% 19.4% 17%
Rarely 17% 36.7% 21.4% 27.4% 28%
Often 8% 26.2% 34.6% 29.2% 32%
Always 3% 13.0% 33.2% 20.2% 18%
Don’t know 2% 3.2% 4.9% 3.8% 5%
Source: Afrobarometer 2008
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4 CONCLUSION
In general, the 2011 elections proved successful for the EMN, with a credible 
monitoring process being maintained despite greatly reduced outside resources. One 
issue that does need to be looked at for future elections is whether the monitoring 
process needs to start earlier, at the time that parties’ internal selection processes 
are taking place and lists are being compiled. Media reports in 2011 showed a great 
deal of violence in the nomination period when both the ANC and IFP lists were 
finalised. Given that a position high on the list of any of the larger parties in South 
Africa virtually guarantees election as a representative, and that the majority of 
wards in municipal elections are won by either the ANC or the DA, for individual 
politicians the stakes in the internal selection processes are often higher than in 
public elections.
The importance of internal selection processes is heightened further by the fact that 
South Africa remains a single-party dominant system. The ANC looks set to retain 
an overall majority for the foreseeable future not only in the National Assembly, but 
it in at least seven of the nine provinces and in the majority of municipalities outside 
the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Therefore for the politically ambitious, in 
most of South Africa, internal elective processes are the key to a political career.
This raises a further question of whether democracy would be strengthened by 
the monitoring of internal party elective processes and not just public elections, 
even when these take place outside election periods. The ANC’s 52nd National 
Conference held in Polokwane in 2007 was marked by a high degree of indecorum. 
The 53rd National Conference, scheduled to be held in Mangaung in December 2012, 
will be another landmark event in South African politics and public confidence in 
democratic institutions will be strengthened if it is seen to operate in a dignified and 
fair manner.
An unrelated but equally important question is how the use of technology will 
change election monitoring. In the past, a key factor in the success of any election 
monitoring programme was the number of trained personnel on the ground. 
Technology has the potential to be a game changer in allowing any member of the 
public to be an election monitor and report incidents which threaten the integrity 
of the electoral process. While potentially enhancing the sensitivity and scope of 
the election monitoring process, there are also potential downsides that need to be 
addressed.
It is unlikely that members of the public will be aware of the niceties of election 
law or the Electoral Code of Conduct. As a result, there is a danger that reporting 
mechanisms will be swamped by false positives that need to be verified by a relatively 
small group of trained personnel. This system could also, in theory, be ‘gamed’ by 
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unscrupulous political parties. The EMN’s SMS hotline was an innovative attempt 
to make use of technology to improve the monitoring process. In theory it was 
sound, and some useful data was captured by it, but it only produced a low number 
of reports which were noticeably biased towards Johannesburg and Cape Town. A 
public reporting programme like the SMS hotline needs a reasonable amount of 
public exposure, through advertising in both the print and electronic media, as well 
as sympathetic media coverage, in order to penetrate the public’s consciousness. 
The theory behind the SMS hotline was sound, however, and it has the potential to 
benefit the monitoring of future election campaigns.
The EMN did monitor social networking sites during the campaign, including 
the party and major candidate pages on Facebook and Twitter. This did not uncover 
many new incidents during the campaign, but some members of the public were 
attempting to engage with political parties around issues such as registration 
problems and problems at polling stations on voting day. The political parties did not 
yet seem to have the resources to respond to the public efficiently, but it shows  that 
at least some members of the public view this as a viable communication channel 
which may be of use for future monitoring programmes 
One final issue, which could become lost in the reporting of election monitoring, 
is the importance of the de-escalation and conflict resolution work carried out by 
EMN field personnel. While Ficksburg was a high profile successful intervention, 
many other interventions took place away from the public eye – indeed in places 
and at times where the glare of publicity would have been extremely damaging. In a 
number of communities across South Africa, election boycotts and threats to disrupt 
voting were averted, and potential disorder around candidate selection was nipped 
in the bud. Feedback from EMN Provincial Co-ordinators showed that many felt 
this to be one of the most valuable aspects of the programme, but its impact remains 
difficult to quantify numerically.
Finally, the data revealed a heartening picture of electoral democracy in South 
Africa. It is important that there is an established monitoring process. More 
importantly, the monitoring process revealed very few pre-election incidents of 
violence. The data revealed that the vast majority of South Africans may vote and 
express their opinions without fear of retribution. The vast majority of incidents 
recorded were ‘low-intensity’ incidents. Where serious incidents occurred they were 
concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal, posed no major threat to the elections, and even in 
KwaZulu-Natal were reported to be less prevalent than in previous elections. Overall 
the 2011 elections ran smoothly and took place in a peaceful, even jovial, atmosphere. 
However, public opinion on South Africa’s pre-election political space is a cause for 
concern. A healthy democracy does not just require free and fair elections, they must 
also be seen to be free and fair and agreed to be so across cleavages. South Africa is 
56
c. Africa and G. lynch
judged harshly by its electorate. Further research is required to assess whether this 
remains the case. In the meantime, the IEC, political parties, and other concerned 
organisations will need to work at re-assuring the electorate about these issues. 
When viewing the EMN data in conjunction with Afrobarometer survey data (2008) 
on perceptions of political space in South Africa, it becomes clear that pre-election 
campaign space is fragile and will therefore need to be nurtured for future elections.
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